Sign-in anomalies
Impossible travel, unfamiliar locations, atypical sign-in times. Correlated against the user's normal behaviour, not a global average.
Managed Identity Threat Detection & Response (ITDR) for UK SMBs
Your endpoints have EDR. Your firewall has IPS. But the attacker doesn't need malware — they need a token. Managed Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR) watches Entra ID and Microsoft 365 for the behaviour MFA can't stop on its own.
Six surfaces attackers abuse when they can't get malware onto a device.
Impossible travel, unfamiliar locations, atypical sign-in times. Correlated against the user's normal behaviour, not a global average.
Push-bombing, repeated prompts, adversary-in-the-middle proxies like Evilginx. Token session theft caught at the session level.
Malicious app consent, risky delegated permissions, suspicious publishers. Enterprise-app grants reviewed and revoked.
Inbox rules hiding BEC activity, auto-forwarders to external, rogue delegates. The quiet, weeks-long fraud vectors.
Role assignments, Conditional Access policy tampering, unused Global Admin accounts reactivating. The blast-radius moves.
Rogue tenants, guest account abuse, B2B invitations that shouldn't exist. The back doors nobody checks.
A real pattern of adversary-in-the-middle phishing, reconstructed from a typical ITDR timeline.
Convincing "review document" email. User enters credentials and approves MFA. The proxy captures the session token. User sees their document, unaware anything happened.
Attacker uses the stolen token from a datacentre IP in a different country. User's normal sign-in pattern is London office + home. New location, new user agent, same token. ITDR flags it.
All active sessions revoked. Account disabled. Inbox rules audited and removed. OAuth grants reviewed. Forensic export taken. Total time, detection to containment: under two minutes.
User wakes up to a plain-English summary: you were phished, we stopped it, here's what you need to do (change password, re-enrol MFA, verify no mail was sent). You get the same brief.
Most SMBs think MFA means "we're secure". Modern attackers sidestep it with session theft, consent phishing, and infrastructure nobody in-house looks at. ITDR watches the identity layer the way EDR watches endpoints — continuously, automatically, and with a human SOC on the other end.
EDR protects devices. ITDR protects identities. A stolen token or abused OAuth grant doesn't touch a device — it's pure cloud. ITDR watches Entra ID, Microsoft 365 and Conditional Access for behaviour that endpoint tools can't see.
Yes. ITDR is defence-in-depth, not a replacement. MFA stops most attacks; ITDR catches the ones that slip past — MFA fatigue, token theft, AiTM phishing, OAuth abuse.
Primary focus is Microsoft 365 and Entra ID. We also monitor identity providers like Okta and Google Workspace where deployed. Signal is correlated with EDR and email security in one SOC view.
SOC confirms, revokes active sessions, disables the account, resets credentials and kills persistence (OAuth tokens, inbox rules, forwarders). You're notified in parallel with a plain-English brief.
Yes. ITDR complements Conditional Access by catching behaviour CA policies don't cover — post-authentication session anomalies, OAuth grant abuse, insider threats.
No. ITDR is passive — it reads sign-in logs, audit logs and Graph activity. The only time a user notices is when they are the compromised account, at which point they're glad we noticed.
ITDR for identities, EDR for devices. Same SOC, one correlated view of an incident.
Read more 02Deeper tenancy-level detections for M365 — mailbox rules, risky apps, OAuth grants, suspicious forwarders.
Read more 03The humans on the other end. Triage, auto-response, incident reporting.
Read moreFree 30-minute review of your Entra ID tenancy. We'll show you the OAuth grants, risky sign-ins and persistence mechanisms you probably don't know about.